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EVIL-A RELIGIOUS MYSTERY: 
A PLEA FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE 
MODEL OF THEODICY 
Louis Dupre 
Major problems in modern theodicy derive from a rationalist conception of 
God-alien to living faith-and from an abstract, theologically neutral defi-
nition of good and evil. The alternative model here proposed rests on a more 
intimate union of finite with infinite Being which, on the one hand, allows 
the creature a greater autonomy and responsibility, and, on the other hand, 
enables the Creator to share in the suffering of his creatures and thereby to 
redeem them. 
[To the Memory of Peter Bertocci, a true Christian] 
1. The Concrete-Religious Versus the Rationalist-Abstract Approach 
Theodicy today enjoys the dubious reputation of a failed experiment. Few 
outside the small circle of persistent believers in it would grant that it has 
succeeded in accomplishing what it set out to do. That failure has become 
more painfully apparent as our sensitivity to, as well as the increased visibil-
ity of, evil, both moral and physical, have intensified our questioning. The 
sheer magnitude of evil which our age has witnessed in death camps, nuclear 
warfare, internecine tribal or racial conflicts, have lowered our tolerance level 
for what once was accepted as a necessary part of life. Indeed, the presence of 
evil has impressed itself more powerfully than the presence of God upon the 
minds of many of our contemporaries for whom the primary question is no longer 
how God can tolerate so much evil, but rather how the more tangible reality of 
evil still allows the possibility of God's existence. Beyond religious and ideo-
logical differences our contemporaries have attained a remarkable agreement 
that evil "was not meant to be," that it constitutes an alien invasion into our lives. 
To an unprecedented degree we feel the need to "justify" the presence of evil in 
our world. Yet we have lowered or abandoned our expectations to receive an 
adequate answer to the question Unde malum? from philosophy. Indeed, specu-
lative attempts to reduce the question to a theoretical issue tend to render the 
reality of evil less rather than more acceptable. 
Evil invites philosophical speculation, yet it is the cliff on which philoso-
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phy suffers shipwreck. By a paradox unique to our time we remain simulta-
neously aware of both terms of the opposition. Schopenhauer anticipated the 
paradox when he wrote: "Without doubt it is the knowledge of death, and 
along with this the consideration of the suffering and misery of life, which 
gives the strongest impulse to philosophical reflection and metaphysical ex-
planation of the world. If our life were endless and painless, it would perhaps 
occur to no one to ask why the world exists, and is just this kind of world it 
is."1 1\vo distinct philosophical reactions have emerged. Some contemporary 
thinkers attempt to repair by one philosophy the damage wrought by another, 
believing that what has been philosophically misstated can be philosophically 
corrected. Logicians have endeavored to point out the many non sequiturs 
that lead to the conclusion-"Hence an omnipotent, omniscient, good God 
cannot exist." Rightly. A remedial strategy alone does not suffice, however, 
particularly not when its authors fail to question the more fundamental an-
thropomorphic premises which inspired the objections. But even those who 
succeed in replacing a simplistic conception of God by a philosophically more 
coherent one, do not dispel our basic doubt whether any kind of autonomous 
philosophical speculation would be capable of meeting a difficulty born in 
metaphysical despair. The philosopher may, of course, dismiss such doubts 
as unreasonable and insist that on his terrain the discussion must be restricted 
by the clearly defined limits of logical argument. 
To be sure, such basic work is needed. But a more fundamental problem 
remains: theodicy is based upon a concept of religion in which the believer 
will hardly recognize his or her own. As Kant defined it, theodicy consists 
in "the defense of the. supreme wisdom of the Creator (Urheber) of the 
world against the charges raised by reason on the basis of what conflicts 
with a meaningful order (Zweckwidrig) in the world. "2 The God hereby 
presented is not merely "less" than the "Father" whom Jesus revealed or than 
the God of Israel: He essentially differs from either. To be sure, there is 
nothing wrong with an attempt to articulate philosophically the dependence 
of creation on God, while leaving all other aspects out of consideration. If 
finite being depends on an omnipotent, wise Creator, that dependence is 
worth investigating. The problem begins, however, when that dependence is 
conceived exclusively in terms of efficient causality. The link between God 
and the creature is obviously more intimate than that between an efficient 
cause (as modern thought conceived of it) and its effect.3 To represent it 
exclusively in causal terms makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
justify any suffering avoidable in the creation of an all-wise, omnipotent God. 
The so-called physico-theological argument whereby the mind proves the 
existence of God on the basis of the cosmos, becomes then inverted into a 
normative rule that determines the limits of divine action in the world. One 
of the modes in which God relates to creation comes thereby to function as 
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the very standard of his activity with respect to the cosmos and all that is in 
it. 
A theodicy based upon such a narrowly conceived, purely causal relation 
differs, of course, from the older one that rested upon a more inclusive rela-
tionship between God and creation. In the following pages I intend to return 
to that older tradition (medieval and, in part already Platonic) by taking ac-
count of other, specifically religious modes of conceiving that relation. Such 
an approach, though more modest in its claims than the rationalist one tends 
to be, may in the end prove more religiously appropriate and therefore also 
more fruitful. As Brian Hebbelthwaite observed: "One has actually to meet 
religious people, Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, Jews, Muslims, and see how 
they in fact confront the world's evil, if one is going to grasp something of 
the resources of religion for coping with suffering and wrong. "4 It should be 
clear from the outset: to adopt this approach is not to renege on philosophical 
theology, but to expand it beyond the rationalist limits within which a purely 
causal, basically deist philosophy has constrained it. The method of philosophy 
imposes certain restrictions upon such a use of "dogmatic" material, for unless 
the philosopher detaches his religious sources from the absolute authority they 
enjoy within the religious community, philosophy loses its autonomy and 
becomes transformed into theology. Scripture, theology, and mystical specu-
lation provide models for conveying a concrete content to our relation with 
a transcendent absolute.s They do not replace critical reflection. 
A further challenge confronting a religiously "inclusive" approach is that 
the religious sources which direct its search date from a remote past and often 
present an anthropomorphic image of God which today's educated believer 
may find hard to take as literal truth. This applies, of course, most obviously 
to the older books of the Bible, but even the more recent ones of the New 
Testament create problems of interpretation. A literal reading of some of the 
historical narratives may considerably add to the difficulties of a philosophical 
theodicy, rather than reducing them. I must confess that in this respect I find 
the methods of those Christian philosophers who commendably react against 
a deist rationalism often seriously wanting in the interpretation of ancient texts. 
Too many appear unwilling to accept that the meaning of a text lies in the total 
context. Applied to canonical texts dating from a remote past this principle 
would appear to require some acquaintance not only with the literary context, 
but also with the historical one. The meaning of a passage in archaic writings 
such as the books of the Pentateuch cannot be gathered by the same methods 
we use for analyzing a modern study of history. To treat an ancient narrative 
as a critically historical discourse can only set philosophical reflection on the 
wrong track from the start. One may attempt to extricate oneself from those 
self-inflicted problems by arguing that none of the improbable assumptions 
inherent in a literal reading is "demonstrably false. "6 But no discipline known 
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to me has ever profited from accepting highly unlikely claims as true as long 
as they cannot be positively demonstrated to be false. 
On the opposite side, however, the question arises whether a rationally 
"edited" reading of ancient sacred texts would not lead us right back to the 
kind of rationalist theodicy we are trying to avoid. Can we still claim to be 
more intrinsically religious than rationalists when we leave out what cultural 
or personal taste finds hard to accept? Which principles enable us to discern 
the essential, religious message from the anthropomorphic metaphor? This 
much appears certain: a liberal exegesis has taken critical liberties which 
would fundamentally obstruct any attempt to base theodicy upon a scriptural 
idea of God. What then must be the criterion for responsibly reading the Bible 
as an account of divine action? To eliminate all "anthropomorphism," as the 
Enlightenment attempted, leaves us with no more than the lifeless skeleton on 
which deism built its idea of God. Moreover, in the case of the religiously 
more inclusive model of theodicy here presented, it would in principle deny 
the most fundamental datum of Jewish, Christian, and Moslem religious an-
thropology, namely that God has created man in his own image and likeness. 
Despite these difficulties I do not believe that preserving the biblical principle 
forces us literally to accept the more primitive metaphors in which this prin-
ciple has been concretely presented. Among them we count biblical images of 
God's all too human emotions Gealousy, anger, etc.), his abrupt and by human 
standards arbitrary decisions and subsequent repentance, his creation of cos-
mos and persons in the manner of physical fashioning (in Genesis 2, as a potter 
working with clay). It is not possible to define once and for all at which point 
representations become unacceptably anthropomorphic. The rational demands 
of interpretation develop under the impact of new scientific theories about 
cosmos and person, but also of theological and metaphysical refinement. What 
to the J writer of Genesis appeared perfectly acceptable may no longer appear 
so to us. But it seems not unreasonable to generalize that a representation 
becomes unsatisfactory when even serious. believers perceive it as conflicting 
with the ideas of God, person, and cosmos which centuries of philosophical, 
theological, and scientific reflection have left us. It would be difficult con-
clusively to demonstrate the falsehood of such representations, as 
fundamentalist interpreters challenge us to do. Yet much of what is not de-
monstrably false may strike an educated believer in our time as improbable 
beyond falsehood. At least in the area of theodicy little may be gained from 
the use of canonical texts for the support of representations which believing 
philosophers would find it hard to accept as literal truth. Even if such repre-
sentations are no more than highly improbable to the educated, they cease to 
be useful for the particular task of theodicy which consists in making the idea 
of God more (rather than less) acceptable: in the face of evil. 
Finally, and most importantly, we must remind ourselves that not all reli-
EVIL-A RELIGIOUS MYSTERY 265 
gious traditions share the same assumptions about the origin and significance 
of evil, and hence that there is no single "religious answer" to evil. Positions 
vary from a strong affirmation of evil as an ultimate principle coequal with 
the good in Manicheism, to a denial of its reality as an illusion in the more 
radical Buddhist and Vedantic monist schools. Between these two extremes 
theist responses range from an evil inherent in the finite condition as such, 
to evil as the sole responsibility of the human race (through the fall and 
subsequent sins). Evil provokes, of course, the strongest reaction among such 
monotheists as Jews, Christians, and Moslems who consider all finite being 
the creation of a free God. Here again the nature and urgency of the crisis 
have resulted in a variety of responses. Judaism alone presents several mod-
els. According to the archaic retaliation model, God inflicts suffering as a 
punishment for human sin. But, one might wonder, why should humans, 
created by God, commit sin? Israel never ceased to struggle with this ques-
tion, and many felt compelled to look in a different direction. One alternative 
model delays the overcoming of evil till a future time of history. But why 
should creation have to pass through evil in order to achieve final good? In 
the face of such major difficulties two different models emerged. The Book 
of Job concludes that humans are not in a position to question God's inscru-
table decrees, while Deutero-Isaiah, in his description of the suffering ser-
vant, equally desisting from seeking the origin of suffering or its future goal, 
considers suffering itself intrinsically redemptive. 
Christianity adopted all four of these models but connected the idea of 
punishment primarily to Adam's fall, while grounding the idea of redemptive 
suffering in the passion and death of Christ. In addition, early theologians 
combined those scriptural positions with the prevailing philosophical ones 
(mainly Neoplatonic and Stoic). Thus they adopted the Neoplatonic interpre-
tation according to which evil consists in a lack of being-a privatio boni. As 
John Hick has shown, this solution, suitable for an order of being in which 
necessary emanations move down from the One, causes serious difficulties in 
a universe freely created by God.' While the Neoplatonic One is not respon-
sible for all the ills inherent in the lower hypostases that with absolute neces-
sity emanate from it, a free, omnipotent Creator chooses what is to exist. 
Augustine who was chiefly responsible for establishing this privative concep-
tion of evil in the West, attempted to counter the objection by means of a Greek 
aesthetics of form. Contrast, for him, including the contrast between good and 
evil, adds to the perfection of the created form. Needless to say, an aesthetic 
principle of perfection that requires the presence of physical pain and moral 
evil and that results in the final damnation of most moral agents, hardly 
corresponds to the Christian idea of God's goodness or to that of the individual's 
responsibility. The God of love preached in the Gospel of salvation here has 
made room for an Olympian Artist of dramatic form. Nor does one soften that 
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grim picture much by declaring that the Creator merely allows moral evil, as 
long as one holds God to be capable of freely creating a world that contains less 
suffering and less moral evil. "One cannot say that God both is blameless in 
respect of the natural evil in our world, because He alone allows it as something 
inseparable from the world's good, and that He could, had He wished, have 
created a better world in which there would have been less natural evil."8 Au-
gustine obviates any divine obligation to create a better world by the idea of 
contrast, while he uses the privatio boni (hardly suitable for aesthetic contrast) 
to acquit God from any complicity with the evil needed for that contrast. 
2. Created Autonomy ~rsus Causal Determinism 
The positions that in the wake of theological and philosophical controver-
sies came to prevail in much of Western thought under the direct or indirect 
impact of St. Augustine resulted in the following questionable theses. 
1. God creates the intelligent agent free, yet predestines him or her to dam-
nation or salvation. 
2. The good exists as an independent value prior to the Creator's choice. 
3. God remains unaffected by the finite reality. 
All of these theses would at a later time and in modified form find their way 
into the rationalist assumptions of the theodicy formulated in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century philosophy which, to a great extent, is still surviving 
today. The modern assumptions may be summarized as follows: 
1. While the Creator is the efficient cause of creation, the autonomy of the 
creature is severely restricted. Even the exercise of free will must somehow 
be determined by the causal impact of an omnipotent, omniscient Creator. 
2. Ideals of goodness and value preexist our pursuit of them. The free agent 
may ratify or reject them, but does not constitute them. 
3. The Creator stands entirely outside His creation and remains untouched by 
suffering and the effects of moral evil. 
The alternative model presented in this essay rejects all three of these as-
sumptions in favor of more authentically Christian and, I hope, more coher-
ently philosophical principles. Yet before confronting the two models to one 
another we need to consider the original theological theses as well as the 
philosophical assumptions more closely. 
The controversy over divine predestination did not reach a critical stage 
until the sixteenth century, when Calvin denied the exercise of free choice 
in the order of grace and when Thomists and Molinists initiated their acri-
monious dispute de auxiliis. For Banez and his Thomist followers, God's 
position as the absolutely universal cause of creation entailed that He had to 
be responsible for at least a "negative reprobation" of some, previous to any 
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personal merits and demerits. God causes no evil, but decides not to cause 
the good that would prevent evil from occurring. Left to its own fallen and 
fallible liberty, the finite will without God's efficacious grace inevitably sins. 
To this determinism Molina and his school, anxious to preserve human re-
sponsibility, opposed a free human causality next to, and partly in competi-
tion with, divine causality. These conflicting positions share the burden of 
an impossible task: in one case reconciling total divine causality with human 
responsibility for evil, in the other, squaring total human responsibility with 
divine causality. 
The second thesis posits the good as an ideal apriori, preceding God's 
creative act, and thus imposing upon a moral God the obligation to create the 
universe which approaches this ideal as closely as a finite composition is able 
to. The same necessity which determines the divine being thereby extends to 
creation, leaving no room for either divine freedom or finite contingency. 
Leibniz who formulated the position into a clearly articulated principle, at-
tempted to escape its pantheistic implications by distinguishing between the 
"absolute" necessity to create the best possible world (which he denied) and 
the "moral" necessity by which God owed it to his goodness to create the best 
possible (which he affirmed). In this rationalist scenario, God contemplates 
the non-existent essences of several possible worlds, after which He decides 
to create the actual world in accordance with His goodness-though He was 
not intrinsically forced to do SO.9 Even if we leave out of consideration the 
untenable real distinction between God's goodness and His omnipotence, we 
must still question Leibniz's interpretation of divine omnipotence. Does it 
refer to God's power to do ~anything at all"? That is hardly meaningful, and 
Leibniz himself hastens to restrict it to what is logically possible and compos-
sible with God's other attributes. If God is supremely good, He is not able to 
do evil. We should then restrict our definition of omnipotence so as to define 
God's ability to do anything He wills in accordance with His divine nature. 
But even then the term "anything He wills" raises further questions. God's 
"acting" expresses His nature; it serves not, as it does for me, as a means to 
satisfy particular wants or desires by the attainment of goals that lie outside 
me. A wide gap separates what I am from what I attempt to attain by means 
of acts devised to complement my experienced deficiency. None of this 
applies to God. Nor am I from my own position able to conceive what God's 
acting implies or does not imply. All I can do is look at the concrete, visible 
result of that divine action which we call creation. But here precisely theodicy 
ought to follow a procedure opposite to the one it usually follows when it 
decrees that the world must conform to those standards of human rationality 
which it has apriori set up for God. A genuine, religious theodicy begins by 
accepting creation as it is (including its evil) as a visible expression of God's 
nature, rather than by dictating a priori what a divine expression must be 
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like. As we shall see, such an attitude does not condemn theodicy to blind 
faith, for it must critically examine what it may learn of the divine nature on 
the basis of this created expression, and it may conceivably conclude that this 
created expression fails to meet even minimal human standards of goodness. 
But it should do so on the basis of the total evidence (including the one 
provided in the specifically religious experience of faith) rather than of an 
apriori, narrowly rationalist definition of what God ought to be and therefore 
ought to do. 
Returning then to Leibniz's argument, it should be clear that the idea of a 
divine choice with an antecedent moment of deliberation and a consequent 
moment of decision, patterned after the model of human persons deliberating 
about several alternatives, is itself heavily anthropomorphic. Kolakowski puts 
it well: 
~In God Himself essence and existence converge and this implies that His 
will is identical with His essence. God neither obeys rules which are valid 
regardless of His will nor produces these rules according to His whims or as 
the result of deliberating various options; He is those rules. Unlike humans, 
God never faces alternative possibilities and then freely decides which of 
them He ought to choose; His decisions are necessary aspects of His Being-
and therefore they could not have been different from what they are; yet they 
are free in the sense that no superior powers, no norms of validity independent 
of God, bind Him. He is what He does, decides, orders. Consequently we 
may say neither that the definitions of what is good and true precede 
God, ... nor that He precedes them."10 
In addition to these intra-divine difficulties of God "choosing" the best pos-
sible world, there are others inherent in the very concept of "best possible 
world." Bergson pointed them out and dismissed the entire idea in a few 
lapidary sentences. 
~I can, at a stretch, represent something in my mind when I hear of the 
sum-total of existing things, but in the sum-total of the non-existent I can see 
nothing but a string of words. So that here again the objection is based on a 
pseudo-idea, a verbal entity. But we can go further still: the objection arises 
from a whole series of arguments implying a radical defect of method. A 
certain representation is built up a priori, and it is taken for granted that this 
is the idea of God; from thence are deduced the characteristics that the world 
ought to show; and if the world does not actually show them, we are told that 
God does not exist."11 
One imposes no undue restrictions upon divine perfection by declaring God 
unable to achieve what conflicts with the nature of the finite. But finite being 
is intrinsically imperfect and any attempt to measure its perfection depends 
itself on finite, hence intrinsically, imperfect norms. Thus the idea of the best 
possible world imposes upon the Creator a subjective, human standard. 
The most serious problems begin when modern theodicy attempts to square 
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the idea of a perfect Creator with the creation of free agents capable of 
perpetrating moral evil and inflicting suffering upon other creatures. On this 
issue the modern assumption leads to the most questionable conclusions. Both 
theodicy's adversaries and advocates hold a concept of freedom that from the 
start sets the discussion on the wrong track. Thus Antony Flew argues that 
for an action to be free it suffices that it not be compelled-which, for him, 
entails not that it is unpredictable, but that the person nevertheless could have 
acted differently had he chosen to do so. From these premises he concludes 
that an omnipotent Creator could have created persons who would always (or 
more often) have acted rightly.12 I. L. Mackie concurs: human beings could 
have been so constituted as freely to choose the good. The idea of a God who 
could not control men's actions leads to what he calls the "paradox of om-
nipotence."!3 How the idea of a will determined always to choose the good 
remains compatible with freedom escapes me. Nor do I see how in a theory 
of predetermined freedom evil could avoid being ultimately attributable to 
God.!4 Yet the most questionable concept appears to be that of a finite free-
dom created with a built-in resistance to evil. Freedom is far more than the 
power to say yes or no to divinely pre-established values with or without a 
divine impulse toward one or the other. Its signal characteristic consists not 
in the power to ratify pre-established values but in the ability to create them. 
Freedom can tolerate contingency and an extremely restricted field of oper-
ation. But to interfere with its creative power is to replace freedom by cau-
sality. Creativity constitutes its very essence. Both theists and atheists admit 
freedom to be "given," but it is not given in the way of causal determination. 
Even a wholly pre-established order of values reduces its scope. Most of us 
agree on that point when it comes to humanly induced unconscious condi-
tioning (including hypnosis), such as B. F. Skinner proposes for the improve-
ment of society as a whole. But the same objection holds true for any divine 
"conditioning." Even a divinely pre-established order leaves man none but a 
negative creativity (as Sartre perceived). Yet, strangely enough, this in-
authentic, reduced freedom of choice, the very same one the secular critics 
of theodicy reject in predestinationist theologies, is the one they propose as 
the only one compatible with the existence of a good God. 
God creates neither values nor strong or weak inclinations to choose them; 
He creates creators who depend on a divine source for the exercise of their 
creative spontaneity, but not for its determination. Nor need such a theory 
result in the kind of atheism it has entailed in some existentialist philosophies. 
For an essential part of the free agent's creative project consists in practically 
recognizing his overall dependence. Failure to do so deprives us of an absolute 
in determining the hierarchy of values, while forcing us to elevate relative 
values into absolutes. Now, a freedom responsible for creating its own values 
remains intrinsically and irrevocably able to erect false absolutes and even to 
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invert the creative impulse into an annihilating power. Genuine freedom is 
endowed with a capacity unlimited for evil as well as for good. In creating 
free agents God has released a power which may tum against Himself. In 
Berdyaev's words: "Evil presupposes freedom and there is no freedom with-
out the freedom of evil, that is to say, there is no freedom in the state of 
compulsory good."15 Leibniz understood this better than some of his followers. 
The real issue concerning freedom is not whether it deserved to be created, 
but whether God's necessary being is compossible with such an unrestricted 
creaturely autonomy as freedom requires. Since that issue obviously falls 
outside the limits of theodicy, we need not enter into it. Nor is it a problem 
for theodicy to solve whether there may exist spiritual beings endowed with 
a clearer sense of freedom's potential and therefore less inclined to pervert 
its creative autonomy (e.g., angels). Its own question concerns the compati-
bility of free agents as we know them with the existence of a good and wise 
Creator. Moreover, theodicy should be concerned only with the compatibility 
of the world as it is, not with the possibility of proving the existence of God 
on the basis of this world's perfection. Symptomatic for the confusion that 
often occurs between the two is that many modem treatises of theodicy begin 
with a discussion of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. What-
ever Hume's intention may have been, he did not write an anti-theodicy, that 
is, a refutation of any possibility to defend the idea of God in the face of evil 
in creation. The Dialogues deflate the exaggerated claims of a natural theol-
ogy which on the basis of a purely philosophical speculation concerning order 
and purpose in the world concludes to the existence of God. Even on those 
terms we should beware of overstating the case. Does Philo, the most skep-
tical of the three participants in the dialogue, after having invalidated all 
arguments presented in favor of a benevolent Providence, not concede in the 
end: "In many views of the universe and of its parts, particularly the latter, 
the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force, 
that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and 
sophisms; nor can we then imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose 
any weight on them. "16 One may, of course, dismiss this statement as the 
expression of a thorough skepticism whereby Philo, after having first inval-
idated the arguments of the other interlocutants, in the end scuttles his own. 
But we may also read this as a sincere attempt to attain "synoptically," that 
is, by an immediate, total impression, what analytic inference withholds. If 
this reading is correct, an "illative sense" would provide what analysis alone 
fails to supply, namely, certitude concerning the existence of an intelligent 
Designer who may be infinitely perfect and good (though these attributes 
cannot be established by natural reason alone).17 
The implications of Hume's argument so understood would be less con-
strictive for philosophical theodicy than much contemporary fideism which, 
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rightly dissatisfied with the rationalist theodicy, prefers to leave the justifi-
cation of God in the face of evil entirely to faith. The philosopher cannot 
remain satisfied with such a total abdication of reason: the presence of evil 
must be shown not to exclude the idea of a good Creator. Nor will the 
philosopher be satisfied with defining "divine goodness" by standards that 
have nothing in common with our human conception of goodness, an equivoc-
ity that, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, would merely result in "an incom-
prehensible attribute of an incomprehensible substance."18 The philosopher 
rightly insists that the idea of an omnipotent, good God be shown to be 
compatible with the actual existence of evil. Reason modestly yet legitimately 
demands only to perceive how an open conflict between a good God and an 
evil world is not inevitable. 
Even that modest goal philosophy cannot meet unless it adequately answers 
the objection of God's supreme indifference to the suffering of his creatures. 
To do so becomes nearly impossible for one who accepts the third of the 
Augustinian theses, especially after it became combined with the idea of the 
Creator as efficient cause in the modem sense. But even medieval scholasti-
cism in denying any real relation between God and the world had placed itself 
in an unfavorable position for defending the Creator against the charge of 
supreme indifference. For such a defense to be effective philosophy would 
have to accept that the sufferings of creation, including the suffering caused 
by human evil, affect the Creator himself. A number of philosophical systems 
broadly comprehended under the general name of "process philosophy" have 
attempted to justify such a divine participation in finite processes. Despite 
essential disagreements concerning the relation between the finite and the 
infinite, divine personhood, the role and ultimate destiny of human individ-
uals, all these systems share Whitehead's overall vision of the real as a 
creative process, whereby God comes to be with his creation rather than above 
it. In Whitehead's terms: "He shares with every new creation its actual 
world. "19 Indeed, only through the creative process does God attain that full 
actuality to which Whitehead refers as God's "consequent" nature. Rather 
than being an unchanging, transcendent Prime Mover, God is the actual entity 
from which each creative development in time "receives that initial aim from 
which its self-causation starts."20 Various philosophers have interpreted this 
divine participation in various ways, ranging from an impersonal "creative 
event," the source of all human good (Wieman), to a creative personalism 
(Brightman). But only when the idea of a personal God is preserved can 
process philosophy contribute toward making the monotheist position with 
respect to evil more acceptable. 
Peter Bertocci in The Goodness of God shows a clear appreciation of the 
importance of safeguarding this personal character and bases his argument 
on the premise that a creative force resulting in human persons must itself 
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be personal. But such a Creator-Person need not be conceived as self-suffi-
cient, uninhibited by restraints other than those He imposes upon Himself. If 
personhood reaches its highest realization in interpersonal communication, 
then the perfection of the divine Creator would likewise be enhanced, rather 
than weakened, in responding to persons. Furthermore, such a divine Person 
exposes himself to risks analogous to those run by humans in their attempts 
to create good-what Bertocci calls "creative insecurity." 
"Insecurity inheres in the very nature of being a person whose actual freedom 
of personal choice is involved in the pursuit of truth and goodness. Intrinsic 
to the good for persons is the insecurity that can become creative, because 
values are com penetrating, and because persons themselves can choose or-
chestration-within-pattem as they change and grow."21 
Bertocci supports this bold application of the personalist principle to the 
Absolute by an even more daring thesis. As he reads it, the insecurity of the 
creative act expresses a fundamental uncertainty in the very nature of the 
Creator-Person. A refractory element, not a "flaw" in the divine or an imped-
iment imposed upon the divine, but the essential passivity inherent in the very 
act whereby the Absolute gives birth to the relative, prevents the Creator from 
achieving His goals without at the same time having to allow the possible 
intrusion of suffering and evil. 
3. A Passive, Suffering God 
In this section I intend to show that such an idea of a God who renders 
Himself passive in the act of creation presents a more solid, as well as a more 
concretely religious basis for theodicy than a first cause untouched by the 
suffering of creation and unmoved by the effects of moral evil. The doctrine 
of the passion and death of Christ lends indirect, though strong, support to 
this position, as it rests upon the very notion of God who suffers and dies. 
But in all three monotheist faiths mystical and theosophical traditions have 
held that with creation some passivity enters God's very essence. For infinite, 
perfect Being to give rise to being other than itself means not adding to itself 
(as St. Thomas already clearly stated: non datur plus esse), but causing an 
emptiness within its own fullness wherein "otherness" can subsist. Only 
through an "annihilation" (Blonde I) of infinite Being can the finite be another 
being. Though finite being must remain within the infinite, perfect Being 
from which it draws its entire sustenance, as other it assumes a certain 
independence. By allowing it to be in its own right infinite Being ceases to 
wield unlimited power over it, and comes to stand in a relation that is no 
longer exclusively active. 
Now philosophers who adopt Aristotle's definition of God as pure act tend 
to exclude passivity from God as incommensurable with divine perfection. 
Yet if we understand pure act as the opposite of passivity, it becomes itself 
EVIL-A RELIGIOUS MYSTERY 273 
imperfect. For to "act," as opposed to being acted upon, means to "re-act" to 
events and circumstances in a manner that forces the acting subject to go out 
toward the other than itself in order to return to itself in a different manner. 
Obviously, this kind of acting wherein the agent thus loses himself in order 
to find himself anew does not apply to God as He is in Himself. Resting 
within itself a perfect, infinite Being as such cannot be called active any more 
than passive, as Nicholas of Cusa showed in his theory of the divine coinci-
dence of opposites. In creation, however, the two moments of activity and 
passivity simultaneously emerge. Though the act of creation requires itself 
no external support and in this respect may be called entirely "active," in the 
very "otherness" of the created being, God places Himself in a position where 
He is forced to react and thereby to relate passively as well as actively. 
Aristotelians avoid this conclusion by asserting that God has no real relation 
to the world. But such a claim, intelligible enough within Aristotle's theory 
of an uncreated cosmos, makes little sense within a creationist theology. 
On the other side, to introduce passivity in God and autonomy in the 
creature is not sufficient for solving the problem of theodicy. Indeed, even 
the deist with his remote, laissez-faire God implicitly or explicitly holds that, 
once having created the world, God leaves all initiative to the creatures, 
restricting his own activity to preservation and support. If there were no 
further divine intervention, the issue would, once again, be reduced to the 
simple dilemma we have rejected in the first part: Either the world is as good 
as it can possibly be, and to be so, however imperfect, is better than not to 
be. In that case God is justified. Or the world could have been better than it 
is, and then we must conclude that an omnipotent, wise, and good God did 
not create it. For the believer, the "passivity" of the Creator is of a very 
different nature. Rather than creating and then leaving creation to its own 
devices, God never stops reacting to the creature's initiative. Monotheist 
theologies have expressed the interaction between God and creation in several 
ways. Christians affirm this ever renewed divine action by saying that God 
redeems what He has created. Unfortunately, in theodicy believers often use 
the concept of redemption for stopping the gaps of ignorance that remain 
after they have depleted their supply of rational justifications for suffering 
and evil. Thus they end up yielding to the duplicity which Mill denounced, 
by calling "good" in an invisible order (that, in a future world, may become 
manifest) what by ordinary standards cannot but count as "bad." Rather than 
whitewashing evil by such an argumentum ex ignorantia-as irrefutable as 
it is unprovable-the believer should, from the start, admit that this world 
contains a great deal of unexplainable suffering, that creatures endowed with 
a free will remain perfectly capable of causing unqualified evil and often 
avail themselves of this possibility. Rather than using the term "redemption" 
to make suffering and evil vanish into an invisible realm of goodness, the 
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Christian philosopher ought to show, what the ordinary faithful have always 
maintained, namely that in his redemptive action God reacts to real suffering 
and real evil. To be effective in theodicy the idea of redemption must be 
integrated with that of creation as one continuous, active relation of God to 
His creatures. Such a view, contrary to the deist's, envisions divine activity 
as an open-ended, ever renewed dialogue with creation. At each moment of 
time God creatively responds to the conditions shaped by His creatures in the 
preceding moment. A divine response then counteracts existing evil by con-
stantly presenting us with new occasions for the accomplishment of good or 
the redemption of evil. Without having to interfere with the creature's auton-
omy. God's response provides ever novel opportunities for converting evil into 
goodness. Christian writers have consistently upheld this divine ability to 
restore creation to new innocence. Thus Jacques Maritain suggestively argues: 
"Each time that a free creature undoes for its part the work that God makes, 
God remakes to that extent-for the better-this work and leads it to higher 
ends. Because of the presence of evil on earth, everything on earth, from the 
beginning to the end of time, is in perpetual recasting. "22 
To be sure, the ways in which God actively counteracts evil in a creation 
increasingly threatened by it, cannot be "justified" on the basis of an abstract 
concept of human nature. Theology may inform us that God offers ever new 
opportunities for converting past evil into future goodness. It may show how, 
in a condition antagonistic to good, such a reversal must necessarily take the 
form of a struggle, an agon. According to Christian doctrine, God himself 
had to provide both the means and the model of this conversion by suffering 
and dying under the power of evil. But in thus linking the mystery of evil to 
the even greater mystery of redemption we have decidedly left the domain 
of philosophy and introduced considerations not available to a purely philo-
sophical reflection on reality as it is universally manifest. 
The admission of dogmatic doctrines into a universal, philosophical reflec-
tion ought to be justified more thoroughly than this essay allows.23 Here I 
mention only one critically significant reason that forces us to admit them at 
least to some extent. The very standards by which we measure what does and 
what does not count as "good" depend upon the acceptance or rejection of 
an intrinsically religious hierarchization of values. Any attempt to erect a 
system of values upon a religiously neutral basis, common to believers and 
unbelievers, fails precisely in the area where theodicy matters most, namely, 
in deciding what must count as definitive evil. In a recent essay Marilyn 
McCord Adams has shown how ontological commitments affect descriptions 
of values. Moral theories that omit any reference to a transcendent norm differ 
from value systems ruled by a relation to transcendent Being. More specif-
ically, varying ontological commitments "widen or narrow the range of op-
tions for defeating evil with good."24 The believer, not satisfied with 
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exclusively immanent goods may value an intimate sense of God's presence, 
acquired through much pain and suffering, more highly than a satisfaction of 
immediate needs. But different value systems result in different jUdgments 
concerning standards of good and eviPs In his evaluation of what constitutes 
unnecessary evil and what constitutes ultimate goodness, the believer often 
fundamentally disagrees with the nonbeliever. Diametrically opposed atti-
tudes concerning the desirability of terminating an unwanted pregnancy be-
come intelligible only if we take this fundamental disagreement on values 
into account. To recognize major differences in the perception of what in the 
final analysis constitutes evil need not result in the kind of verbal equivocity 
on good and evil denounced by J. S. Mill. Yet it should caution us against 
deciding prematurely what must count as unredeemably evil and what as 
unconditionally good. Once we introduce value judgments based on factors 
that fall beyond the range of a "common" appraisal of what benefits or harms 
human nature, we admit intrinsically private factors that make a universal 
philosophical theodicy, identical for believers and unbelievers, impossible. 
Instead of continuing to attempt such an impossible enterprise, the believ-
ing philosopher should not hesitate to include the redemptive vision of his 
faith in his speculation. From that broadened perspective the experience of 
evil and suffering, however burdensome, can never lead to a final conclusion 
concerning life's balance of good and evil. Nor is such a position based upon 
a purely fideist anticipation of future well-being. For the believer may actu-
ally experience suffering itself as redemptive, that is, as endowed with more 
than a merely negative meaning. "Grace and nature not being two closed 
worlds, but two worlds open to one another and in mutual communication, it 
might happen that the greater progress (of the wheat over that of the cockle) 
would occur more in the order of grace than in that of nature. "26 To refer to 
different modes of experiencing is not to advance an unsupported claim, but 
merely to assert what eminent psychologists, beginning with William James, 
have persistently asserted. 
The distinction here proposed finds unambiguous theological support in the 
doctrine of redemptive suffering which, for Jews, Christians, and Moslems 
transforms the meaninglessness of suffering and evil into different patterns 
of meaning and goodness. In its most radical form, expressed in the New 
Testament theology of Christ's passion and death, the mystery of redemptive 
suffering allows God himself to participate in human distress. No writer has 
pursued the theme of suffering redemptive through God's participation in it 
further than Dostoevskii. Essays on theodicy routinely refer to Ivan 
Karamazov's charge against a God who tolerates unredeemable suffering-
the pain of innocent children and animals who lack the capacity to learn from 
pain. Usually they fail to mention Alyosha's later reply. Alyosha admits the 
full scandal of innocent pain and, even as his brother, refuses to accept it. But 
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he assumes this scandal into the even greater one of God's own suffering. 
When, dying on the cross, Christ feels abandoned by his Father, the tragic 
conflict enters God's own Being. In this intra-divine theologia crucis God is 
set against God, as in Goethe's dark saying: Nemo contra Deum nisi Deus 
ipse. ("No one against God but God himself. ")27 In Christ God assumes all 
human suffering and takes upon Himself the burden of compensating for all 
moral evil. In addition, as the legend of the Grand Inquisitor suggests, He faces 
the failure of a salvation that surpasses the capacity for acceptance of most of 
those to whom it is offered. This greater scandal does not "justify" evil, but 
it makes God a participant in our pain, as Christian theologies have consis-
tently implied, and mystical and theosophical ones have explicitly stated. 
Gnostic and theosophical doctrines in the three monotheist religions have, 
in an even more daring way than Christian orthodoxy, introduced the mystery 
of evil into God's inner life. In contrast to orthodox beliefs, they attribute the 
possibility of evil (though not its actuality) to an intradivine multiplicity the 
harmony of which became disturbed by an unknown cause. The resulting 
conflict gave birth to that realm of unrest and disharmony which is the physical 
universe. 28 Variously formulated in Jewish, Christian, and pagan myths during 
the first centuries of our era, this gnostic doctrine found its most radical 
expression in kaballah mysticism, as it developed between the thirteenth cen-
tury (the Zohar) and the sixteenth century (Isaac Luria). The German theoso-
phist Jacob Boehme attempted to incorporate it in Lutheran theology by 
presenting the intradivine conflict as an opposition between God's wrath and 
God's mercy.29 We hear a final major echo of it in Blake's Prophetic Books 
according to which a fragmentation of the divine harmony has caused an 
intra-divine conflict resulting in the creation of the physical universe.3o 
We may of course dismiss such daring speCUlations as unworthy of philo-
sophical attention. But before doing so we ought to consider that major 
philosophers, beginning with Plato, have persistently turned to ancient myth-
ical and religious interpretations that trace the origin of good and evil to a 
single transcendent source. Even some modern philosophers have attempted 
to trace the opposition between good and evil to a separation of com-
plementaries harmoniously united in the Absolute. Thus in Karl Jaspers's 
memorable treatment of "The Law of the Day and the Passion for the Night," 
night and day appear as two complementary elements within the Absolute: 
intelligible but limited clarity and dark desire of the infinite. The diurnal law 
"regulates our existence, demands clarity, consistency, and loyalty, binds us 
to reason and to the idea, to the One and to ourselves. "31 The night functions 
as the negative desire to transcend finitude, limit, temporality. Though irre-
ducible to the law of the day, the passion for the night is an equally essential 
constituent of human existence. In mythical (and highly controversial) lan-
guage such reflections on complementarity within the Absolute articulate 
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what I have described as the "passivity" that enters infinite Being when it 
gives birth to the finite. Orthodox monotheist theologies have never accepted 
the gnostic equation of creation with the fall. Nor do they accept conflicts 
"within" the Godhead to account for the existence of evil in creation. Rightly, 
because the gnostic myths and their theosophical interpretations result in 
theological inconsistencies as well as in morally problematic positions. But 
the underlying assumption that the possibility of evil cannot be explained 
unless we trace it back to the divine act of creation itself rests on a profound 
insight, no more irrational than God's own participation in human suffering. 
Still, the philosopher cannot but wonder, what such theosophical specula-
tions contribute to the kind of strictly rational reflection he or she is commit-
ted to. Passivity in God and otherness in the creature neither explain the actual 
origin of physical evil nor do they justify its existence. Neither do gnostic or 
theosophical doctrines provide the philosopher with such an explanation or 
justification. It would be unreasonable to expect from them rational explana-
tions which reason itself has been powerless to provide. Theosophical doc-
trines do not reduce the "mysteriousness" of evil. If anything, they deepen 
it. What they may accomplish, however, is to extend the boundaries within 
which theology and the philosophy that has followed its lead conceive of that 
mystery. While the traditional theistic position has attributed the source of 
evil entirely to the creature-either as a result of sin or as an inevitable effect 
of finitude, theosophical doctrines force us to consider also the divine act of 
creation itself and the momentous transition it constitutes in Being from the 
one to the many. This very transition entails the possibility of opposition (and 
suffering!) not only among differently disposed and variously oriented crea-
tures, but even within each single living organism with its own multiplicity 
of tendencies, drives, and instincts. 
Theosophical doctrines, however, tend to go beyond tracing the mere pos-
sibility of physical evil to the creative act. Most of them attribute the actuality 
of evil to a mysterious darkness within God's nature. Here philosophy can 
and should not follow them. Claims of a revelation, altogether inaccessible 
to reason, have no legitimate place in philosophy. Any appeal to a "secret" 
knowledge restricted to a special enlightenment of few, remains in principle 
incompatible with the public goals and universal methods of philosophical 
reflection. Nor could such privileged enlightenment constitute an additional 
source of positive knowledge for the theistic philosopher. Gnostic speculation 
can do no more than open up perspectives different from the ones traditionally 
considered and invite the philosopher to explore them within his/her own 
discipline. In the case of physical evil it draws attention to the divine creative 
act itself. Such a reorientation of the philosophical attention may be highly 
useful for the conception of new, more fruitful models in defining the issue. 
Specifically, in theodicy, it may force us to think of the creative act as being 
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more complex than a simple divine fiat. Since the purview of this article 
limits it to a critique of traditional approaches and a suggestion of an alter-
native model for theodicy, this is not the proper place to develop its philo-
sophical consequences. But it appears that a philosophical theology of the 
process type would be better equipped to accommodate the inherent ambigu-
ity of the creative act with respect to physical evil than one of the traditional 
type which too absolutely separates the Creator from His creation. 
Conclusion 
The theologically inclusive model of theodicy here defended requires the 
concrete religious context of faith for any rational reflection on a mystery 
that attains its full poignancy only within religion itself. As Hegel once 
remarked, only in actual worship are believers capable of overcoming evil. 
It differs from those philosophical theodicees which allege to be based upon 
a rational, but in fact rationalist, idea of God, far removed from living faith, 
if not in actual conflict with it. Theological inclusiveness does not force us 
to abandon the rational methods and goals of philosophy. True enough, on 
the cross philosophy suffers shipwreck, believers and unbelievers unani-
mously declare. But that does not dispense the believing philosopher from 
the task of showing that, within a concrete, theological context, belief in a 
good God is compatible with the existence of evil. In addition, the philoso-
pher must examine whether the theological theses which form the context for 
the believer's concrete evaluation of what must count as a good or an evil 
remain in conformity with reason. Interpretations of Jesus's redemptive suf-
fering as a satisfaction exacted by an angry God or a ransom paid to the devil 
do not satisfy that demand. But no such objections can be raised against the 
central Christian idea of God uniting Himself to finite nature and descending 
in person into the abyss of human suffering and moral evil. In taking account 
of the mystery of evil and redemption, as faith presents it and as the believer, 
to a greater or lesser extent, actually experiences it, the Christian philosopher 
admits a complexity of the issue which the rationalist ignores. In giving birth 
to the finite, God himself inevitably assumes a certain passivity in regard to 
the autonomy of finite being, a passivity that may render Him vulnerable and 
that indeed, according to the Christian mystery of the Incarnation, has in-
duced Him personally to share the very suffering of finite being.32 
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